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Inclusive growth: the challenges of multidimensionality
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Colin Hay
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Tom Hunt and J. Allister McGregor
The University of Sheffield
Abstract The two decades either side of the global financial crisis have seen a
remarkable surge and an equally remarkable reaction to global inequalities. This has
played some part in fuelling the recent populist backlash against globalisation. In
response, many global institutions and some national governments have embraced the
concept of inclusive growth – proposing a policy agenda designed to share the benefits
of economic growth and development more equitably. This paper argues that the
current debate about inclusivity suffers from two major misspecifications that weaken
the concept and undermine the prospect of the economic and political goals it stands for
being achieved. For inclusivity to be meaningful and sustainable it must be understood
in multidimensional terms, but attaching it to orthodox thinking on growth continually
draws the debate back to narrow economic considerations. The concept has also been
hampered by ‘methodological nationalism’, whereby policies for inclusivity are
considered predominantly at the national level without adequate attention being given
to the multilateral dimensions of inclusivity in a world of global interdependence. To be
coherent and applicable, inclusive growth must be (re)conceived multilaterally and
embrace a more multidimensional notion of inclusive development that hinges around
a meaningful conception of human wellbeing.
The two decades either side of the onset of the global financial crisis have seen
inequality rise in significance on the global agenda. Inequalities of wealth,
income, and security, both within nations and between countries, have come
sharply into focus. Although there may have been some amelioration of
income inequality trends in some countries, or in respect of some sections of
This article was originally published with errors, which have now been corrected in the online
version. Please see Correction (https://doi.org/10.1080/09557571.2020.1795355)
 2020 TheAuthor(s). Published by InformaUKLimited, trading as Taylor& Francis Group
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-
NonCommercial-NoDerivatives License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/), which
permits non-commercial re-use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original
work is properly cited, and is not altered, transformed, or built upon in anyway.
Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 2020
https://doi.org/10.1080/09557571.2020.1784849
the global population, it is not clear that there have been reductions in respect
to other dimensions of inequality or of underpinning wealth inequalities
(Atkinson 2015; Piketty 2014; Dorling 2017; Credit Suisse 2019). But regardless
of what the often-flawed statistics on inequality suggest, the perception of the
vicious proliferation of inequality has been unleashed with profound political
consequences within and between nations (Wilkinson and Pickett 2009; Stiglitz
2012; OXFAM 2020). It is this aspect of our global reality that can no longer be
ignored by either politicians or economists. In the context of highly non-
inclusive growth, many of those who regard themselves as the casualties of
globalisation have rallied behind a number of increasingly populist, nationalist
and protectionist political counter-responses. While many proponents of glo-
balisation have argued that the transnational flows of goods, capital and peo-
ple that it has enabled, have greatly enriched and improved the lives of many
people around the world, the post-crisis politics of resentment has increasingly
identified these flows as the source of its discontent. Alongside that, there is
also a recognition of globalised growth as the key driver of environmental deg-
radation and climate change. There has been a growing awareness amongst
advocates of globalisation that, if it is to be defended, it must be made, and be
seen to be made fairer and more environmentally sustainable (OECD 2018a;
ADB 2018; UNDP 2017; World Bank Group et al 2018). We will argue that
these different forms of crisis are interlinked; the ideas of inclusive growth and
environmental sustainability are logically interconnected and efforts to achieve
both can be synergistic. The defence of continued growth rests squarely on the
idea of transforming economic growth from a force that has driven inequality
and environmental degradation into a force that enables better lives
and societies.
At this time, however, the massive loss of public trust in elite politicians,
policymakers and experts also makes inclusive growth one of the key political
challenges of our epoch. There has been a loss of trust in key political actors
and a loss of confidence in some of the key ideas of globalisation and in the
institutions that have been the governors of it (Scholte 2019). In his historical
analysis of the impact of crises on the international order, Harold James (2011,
528) argued that 2009 would be instrumental in a swing away from some key
neo-liberal ideas to ‘a world in which the advantage lies with the strong, who
can muster large concentrations of economic and demographic resources.’. His
analysis suggests the emergence of a new era of realism in international rela-
tions, borne out in part by the ongoing trade war between Trump’s USA and
Xi Jinping’s China. In this return to the past, it is brute power rather than neo-
liberal free trade and comparative advantage that counts. This shift makes it
an unpropitious time to argue for a return to a multilateral appreciation of
inclusive development. However, we will argue that a Skocpolian perspective
provides us with some clues as to how a revision of inclusive growth can be
reconciled with the emergent new realist dispositions of nation-states. In par-
ticular, we agree with Joseph (2011) that the loss of trust in globalisation and
its global institutions can only be made sense of in relation to the domestic
political configurations that national politicians face. To understand how this
relates to the debate over inclusive growth we must look beyond the idea of
narrow economic benefit to consider a broader conception of human wellbeing.
It is precisely because exclusionary, globalised growth has been experienced
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by citizens across a multidimensional range of things that matter for their well-
being (including their identity, security, and sense of self-worth) that we see
the populist turn to nationalist and anti-global politics.
Although the idea of inclusive growth is critical to the renegotiation of the
role of global institutions in a restructuring world order, the tensions and para-
doxes of the current inclusive growth narrative threaten to undermine its
potential contribution. We argue here that although globalisation is de facto
both multilateral and multidimensional, the current international narrative on
inclusive growth still tends to be conducted in narrowly economistic terms
and largely privileged nationalist notions of inclusivity. This plays into the
hands of inward-looking populist politicians whilst failing to fully comprehend
the forces driving populist nationalism. We argue that the debate needs to shift
from one about inclusive growth to one about inclusive development, which in
turn must be understood as both multilateral and multidimensional.
The current ‘inclusive growth’ narrative is conceptually and politically
untenable, leading to a kind of ‘fallacy of composition’ in which improvements
in a narrow range of inclusivity indicators at the national level are taken
(falsely) as evidence of growing inclusivity globally (Mayer 2002). The idea of
inclusive growth must be reframed as a broader notion of inclusive develop-
ment (Klasen 2010; Gupta et al 2015). It must take account of the full range of
ways in which people are excluded from participating in and sharing the bene-
fits of economic growth and development. Some of these mechanisms of exclu-
sion are market based, but many are not; and some are specific to nation states
but many are transnational in character. Not least amongst these strands of
multilateral interdependence is how we engage with and use the planet’s
environmental resources in an equitable and sustainable way. We build an
argument for a conception of inclusive development that would focus on
improvements in human wellbeing and take account of the interplay of eco-
nomic growth and societal changes that produce environmentally sustainable
improvements in the life chances of men, women and children wherever they
live (Munda 2008; Stiglitz et al 2009; OECD 2011, 2018a, 3).
Our warning is that efforts to promote inclusive growth at the national
level are likely to contribute to processes of exclusion and environmental deg-
radation in other nation states if there is no consideration of its multilateral
implications and multidimensional character. Scholte (2019) points out the
contradiction that even as the ideas of liberal globalisation and the institutions
of global governance are under attack by populist nationalism, the actual proc-
esses of globalised production, distribution and consumption continue. As
such, the dynamics generating the outcomes that feed the new realist positions
are also at play. In such a political context, to give up on the struggle of main-
taining and improving the ideals and institutions of global governance would
be folly. As Scholte ominously puts it, ‘tomorrow may prove today’s ‘realists’
to be anything but’ (2019, 23). Only when the benefits of globalisation can be
expressed in more comprehensibly human terms, and be demonstrably shared
in a more just and sustainable manner, will it be possible to convince those
who are being ‘left behind’ that globalisation can be made good and the driv-
ers of nationalist populism be mitigated.
The paper explores the hazardous terminological inexactitude of the current
inclusive growth debate. It then considers the relationship between economic
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growth and broader, more multidimensional notions of social and economic
progress before turning to the operationalization of inclusivity in policy think-
ing, followed by an exploration of the problems of methodological nationalism.
In the conclusion, we discuss what types of policy are required for inclusive
development and argue that the promotion of a sustainable trajectory of inclu-
sive development requires a shift in our thinking and policy interventions
from a predominantly redistributive to a predominantly predistributive dispos-
ition. We conclude by drawing out the governance implications, proposing a
new global compact on inclusive development.
But it is first important to acknowledge that initiatives for inclusive growth
have begun to merge with the UN’s Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).
The SDG framework now provides a natural broader context to reconnect
debates about the relationship between inclusive and sustainable development.
But it is not yet a satisfactory framework. The issues of inequality and inclu-
siveness are specifically addressed in one of the goals (SDG8 – ‘to promote sus-
tained, inclusive and sustainable economic growth, full and productive employment
and decent work for all’), but the thinking behind this goal is under-developed.
It is not clear how this goal in itself might be operationalised and it is not clear
how it relates to the other goals and the overall idea of sustainable
development.
As we will discuss, the conjuncture of any kind of economic growth and
environmental sustainability constitutes a contradiction for some commentators
(Latouche 2004). We do not take this position but instead argue that we are
where we are; capitalism is not going to disappear overnight and the most
realistic option is radical reform that pursues both greater inclusivity and
environmental sustainability. We believe that the proposal for a ‘global com-
pact’ that would operate in complement to the SDGs is required to establish
clearer responsibility for inclusive development between institutions of govern-
ance at all levels. We see this as a starting point for a renewed and genuinely
multilateral conversation on how globally inclusive, sustainable development
can be advanced.
Inclusive growth and development: terminological inexactitude
Consideration of the history of the term ‘inclusive growth’ goes a long way in
explaining the conceptual fuzziness that surrounds the current narrative. The
idea has a long history in debates about the relationship between economic
growth and development. In one of the most durable contributions, Kuznets
(1955) postulated that growing inequality was an integral part of early eco-
nomic growth processes, but that as countries became more developed so
inequality would begin to fall. While the graphs look comforting for aspiring
developing countries, this has proven to be another example of ‘the special
case’ (Seers 1963) – a generalization drawn from the unique experience of
western, early-industrializing economies. What has been more typical is that
high economic growth rates have been accompanied by high levels of inequal-
ity and poverty that have persisted or worsened, without any automatic turn-
ing point being reached.
There have been some exceptions where high growth has been combined
with systems of economic governance that have sought to ameliorate the
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effects of growth on inequality. In the 1970s this range of experiences (mainly
in East Asia) turned thinking in global institutions such as the World Bank
towards the idea of active economic management, where governments were
encouraged to manage the relationship between economic growth, poverty
and inequality (for a discussion see Kanbur 2000). The use of the term
‘inclusive growth’, as it now features in global narratives, is traced by many
commentators specifically back to work of the Asian Development Bank
(ADB), for whom the very rapid but very unequal growth in India and China
was a matter of major economic and political concern. Since that exploration
by the ADB (Klasen 2010), the idea of inclusive growth has continued to
evolve as a term that has a myriad of meanings to a range of national and
transnational institutions (Ranieri and Almeida-Ramos 2013).
Despite what often seems like a cacophony of clashing voices, we can iden-
tify two distinct ways of thinking about inclusive growth that point to the ten-
sions in the idea. The first focuses on inclusive ‘outcomes’; the second on
inclusive ‘processes’. A ‘process’ focus emphasises the opportunities that peo-
ple have to participate in the growth of an economy, while an ‘outcome’ focus
emphasises the ways that growth impacts peoples’ lives and the extent to
which the dividends of growth are equitably shared. In reality, of course, out-
comes and processes are related and the dynamics of the relationship lie at the
heart of development policy debates. We will argue that it is necessary to
move beyond the simple ‘process’ versus ‘outcome’ distinction, but, that being
said, the ideological significance of the starting point should not
be overlooked.
International organisations line up differently across the process-outcome
spectrum. The World Bank’s definition of inclusive growth focuses largely on
the processes whereby people have the opportunity to participate ‘productively’
in the economy, paying less attention to the outcomes arising from such par-
ticipation (World Bank 2009). The UNDP definition, on the other hand, is
broader, encompassing outcomes and processes (UNDP 2017). It is also dis-
tinctive in its attention to the non-income dimensions of each. In conceiving of
inclusive growth in this way, the UNDP draws on its tradition of working
with Amartya Sen’s capability approach. It states that the understanding of
inclusive growth should entail ‘the process of enlarging people’s choices by
expanding their capabilities and opportunities in ways that are sustainable –
from the economic, social and environmental standpoints’ (UNDP 2017, 14).
These different narratives reflect different understandings about the range
and scope of the inclusive growth agenda and betray deeper ideological differ-
ences. They pose questions as to whether attention to a narrow range of mar-
ket-based processes will be enough to address the range of ways in which
people have been excluded from the benefits from growth, and whether the
assessment of outcomes should focus primarily on income inequality or a
broader range of indices.
In his recommendation to the Asian Development Bank as to how inclusive
growth might be better operationalised, Klasen (2010) argues that the defin-
ition of inclusive growth must take account of both process and outcome con-
siderations. Measures of inclusivity, he suggests, must gauge ‘equal non-
discriminatory access to growth’ whilst also rewarding ‘disadvantage-reducing
growth’ (2010, 3). Yet what he gives with the one hand, he appears to take
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away with the other, by suggesting that the difficulty of extending the scope
of the concept to deal with the non-income dimensions lies in whether
adequately ‘hard’ (empirical) indicators can be developed for them.
The remark is symptomatic of a more general technocratic apologism when
it comes to the reality of multidimensionality. Here the implicit mantra tends
to be ‘if we can’t put hard numbers on it, we can’t act on it’. This is reflected
in McKinley’s contribution to the ADB initiative in conjunction with Klasen’s
conceptual work (McKinley 2010). This work sought to develop a more multi-
dimensional Inclusive Development Index, taking account of indicators from
Sen’s human development framework. But the practical difficulty of moving
beyond a limited range of standardised objective measures ultimately limits
the scope of the index. The indicators suffer from an objectivist bias and are
‘economy-close’, in that they do not significantly engage with the social and
political dynamics of exclusion. The intention is laudable, but the effect has
been to reinforce a narrowing focus around economic growth.
A more substantial departure, both theoretically and substantively, is
Gupta et al.’s conception of inclusive development. By this, they mean
‘development that includes marginalized people, sectors and countries in
social, political and economic processes for increased human wellbeing, social
and environmental sustainability, and empowerment’ (2015, 546). They reject
the idea of inclusive growth, seeing it as too restrictively conceived and domi-
nated by an economic orthodoxy that depends on a limited set of narrow and
quantitative indicators. Their argument highlights a key aspect of the political
relationship between measurement and conceptualisation. The measurement
‘cart’ continues to lead the conceptual ‘horse’; the supply of available, ortho-
dox quantitative indicators dictates the scope and the range of the concept,
with powerful and perverse political and policy implications (Stiglitz et al
2009; McGregor and Pouw 2017).
In this respect the OECD’s recent position paper, Opportunities for All: A
Framework for Policy Action on Inclusive Growth, represents a significant inter-
vention. Although it uses the term ‘inclusive growth’, the understanding of the
term that it advances is broader and is closer to the idea of inclusive develop-
ment. In particular, it builds from a human-centric vision of development, ‘in
which wellbeing is the metric of success’ (OECD 2018a, 3).
After the Stiglitz-Sen-Fitoussi Commission, the OECD has emerged as the
leading global advocate of a multidimensional conception of human wellbeing,
developed through a framework for its measurement (the Better Lives frame-
work and its annual OECD ‘How’s Life’ Reports 2011–2020). This framework
is built on acceptance of a dynamic and complex set of relationships between
processes and outcomes and makes it clear that a concept of inclusive growth
cannot be restricted to economic dimensions only. It is understood that out-
comes such as improvements in health and education are important for well-
being but are likely to improve the possibilities of citizens being able to
participate in the economy. It also gives detailed consideration to the processes
whereby people participate in both the economy and society, demonstrating
that the barriers to inclusivity are social, political and institutional, as well as
economic (Kabeer 2010; Boarini et al 2014).
From this OECD perspective, it is not enough for 'process’-focused defini-
tions of inclusive growth to stop at ‘participation’ in the economy. Rather, they
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must look at economic growth and the societal changes that would reduce the
kinds of discrimination that persistently suppress participation in the develop-
ment process. However, the conception of the relationships between economic
growth and societal change remains a problem because of the ways in which
an orthodox understanding of economic growth continues to infiltrate and dis-
tort the framework. The paradox of the OECD’s conception of inclusive growth
is mirrored in the SDGs. Whilst it explicitly accepts the need for a multidimen-
sional appreciation of inclusivity and development, the ideas of orthodox eco-
nomic growth remain a privileged disciplinary perspective and inform central
requirements.
The OECD Inclusive Growth Framework and the SDGs both highlight the
need to address the economic and political crises related to stark inequalities,
as well as the ongoing global environmental crisis. There can be little doubt
that this is a difficult set of agendas to reconcile. As we have noted, on the
more radical side of the environmentalist movement, there are those who
argue that any further economic growth is inimical with environmental sus-
tainability (Latouche 2004; Barry 2016). The inclusive growth initiatives of the
OECD and SDGs are founded in the belief that it is possible to find an accom-
modation that recognizes the need for some levels of economic growth but
where the benefits of this would be more equitably distributed and more
environmentally sustainable. We argue that this accommodation cannot be
founded in the axioms of the orthodox economic growth paradigm, but in a
new growth paradigm guided by principles that give primacy to more equit-
able and environmentally sustainable outcomes and to these values above the
axioms of ‘efficiency’ and ‘profit-maximisation’. The route to this reconciliation
lies in exploring the relationship between human wellbeing and environmental
sustainability (Joseph and McGregor 2019; Helne and Hirvilammi 2015; Hay
and Payne 2015).
The pursuit of economic growth has historically been justified through its
claims to improve human wellbeing, but it is eminently clear that this is not
always or simply been the case. Inequality both within and between countries
mean that some people experience extremely high levels of wellbeing while
others suffer chronic wellbeing failures. Reflecting this wellbeing inequality,
the carbon footprint of people and countries that are experiencing high levels
of wellbeing tend to be massively higher than poorer people in their own
countries or in less developed countries. This indicates that a new inclusive
development paradigm will require a renewed discussion about what we per-
ceive as being needed for wellbeing and the mechanisms that are to be used
for distributing new forms of sustainable prosperity (Jackson 2017). As such, a
new conception of inclusive development must seek to identify and establish
forms of economic growth that are socially, politically and environmentally
sustainable.
In emphasizing the need for a new paradigm for inclusive development to
be environmentally sustainable, however, we warn explicitly against the cur-
rently dominant narrative in the environmentalist movement - ‘the
Anthropocene’. This concept has strongly anti-inclusive implications in that it
builds on a tacit neo-Malthusian agenda (Rockstr€om et al 2009; Malm and
Hornburg 2014). The lack of a political economy analysis in the framing of the
notion of the Anthropocene, and particularly its inattention to inequality,
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generates a tension between improving the wellbeing of poor people and halt-
ing environmental degradation (McAfee 2016). We argue instead that the
environmental and human crises are interrelated and co-constituted and that
the ascendancy of neo-liberal capitalism has been central to the relation
between the two (Munda 2008; Costanza et al 2014; McGregor 2014; Moore
2017). As such, it is central to our argument that the orthodox economic
growth paradigm that has been the driver of both sets of crises must be chal-
lenged (Hay and Payne 2015).
This is where the current inclusive growth narrative comes unstuck. In an
insightful critique of the SDGs, Luebker (2017) argues that they combine
‘heterodox discourse’ with ‘orthodox policies’. Although there are other goals
in the SDGs that acknowledge the multidimensional character of development
processes, how these are to be addressed in policy choices while located in an
orthodox promotion of economic growth is never made clear. Similarly, in the
OECD Framework for Policy Action on Inclusive Growth, the devil is in the
details of its implementation. It has a ‘dashboard’ of four sets of indicators of
inclusive growth, but only one set, ‘[e]qual opportunities and foundations of
future prosperity’, can be considered as focusing directly on human wellbeing
outcomes. This set contains only a very limited number of wellbeing indicators
(by the OECD’s own standards), with most focusing on education and skill
outcomes that are stated to be directly relevant to the functioning of labour
markets. The other three sets of indicators are not concerned with human-cen-
tric wellbeing outcomes, but with system level concerns: ‘the conditions of
governance’, ‘income distribution’ and ‘the efficient functioning of markets’.
Despite the OECD being a global champion of a human-centric, multidimen-
sional wellbeing framework and stating explicitly that its Inclusive Growth
Framework is focused on wellbeing, there is no explanation of how other
dimensions of wellbeing are to be considered. In both the SDGs and the OECD
Framework, the operationalisation of inclusive growth shifts from a rhetoric
spanning a wide range of human outcomes to reveal a much narrower, eco-
nomic process-oriented agenda.
As might be expected from frameworks that are negotiated amongst a wide
range of (usually national) actors and interests, there is something in the SDG
and OECD approaches to inclusive growth to appease almost everyone. But
while the term wellbeing is bandied around in both, it is never clear how a sub-
stantial multidimensional approach to inclusive growth should be operational-
ised to produce the necessary changes away from orthodox economic growth
thinking (McGregor and Pouw 2017). The hegemonic grip of the discipline of
orthodox economics is strong and insidious. The tensions between the asser-
tion of the primacy of economic growth and the aspiration for environmentally
sustainable and inclusive human wellbeing are not fully acknowledged and
certainly are not confronted.
Inclusivity: from national to multilateral, from economic to
multidimensional
The muddle in heterodox-tinged, yet essentially orthodox, framings of inclu-
sive growth is problematic in respect to our understanding of post-financial
crisis politics. As we have argued, an important aspect of this ambiguity—and
8 Hay et al
one largely unacknowledged in the current literature—is that the ‘inclusivity’
of growth, like growth itself, is invariably conceived at the national level.
Inclusive growth is usually seen primarily as a challenge for national policy-
makers to address in their own national economy. That challenge is to render
the nation’s growth inclusive by ensuring that its dividends are more equitably
shared domestically. Posed in this way, inclusive growth is concerned with the
intra-national distribution of the benefits of growth along with the opportunity
to participate in the national growth process. In this framing, the principal
responsibility for ensuring inclusivity of outcomes and opportunities lies with
nation-states and national governments, and the responsibility or duty of care
appears as one they owe to their citizens. In other words, it is consistent with
much of the populist, nationalistic agenda that is advanced by many recently
elected leaders.
The commitment to inclusive growth at the national level is important and
cannot be diminished. But it also must be problematised. The tendency of the
current inclusive growth narrative towards ‘methodological nationalism’ leads
to a mis-specification of the unit of analysis and a misdirection of our under-
standing of the problem of inclusivity.
Methodological nationalism entails a ‘naturalization of the nation-state’ as
the unit of analysis (Wimmer and Glick Schiller 2003, 576). Wimmer and Glick
Schiller suggest methodological nationalism can be traced to Adam Smith’s
Wealth of Nations, noting how ‘the distinction between internal economy and
external relations has become a guiding principle for the evolution of the dis-
cipline (economics)’ (2003, 580). The distinction between the ‘internal’ and
‘external’ dimensions of economies plays a crucial role in generating the para-
dox we see in the inclusive growth agenda.
Methodological nationalism sustains two bodies of economic thinking that
stand in unresolved tension to each other and are evident in both the OECD
inclusive growth and SDG narratives. One strand emphasises the globalised
and interconnected nature of markets, to which national economies must
adjust and adapt. The other focuses on national economic issues and sets a
policy agenda in which consideration of the dynamic world beyond is residual.
Gore’s analysis of the development strategies of the East Asian countries
explains that there is a hybrid between the two: ‘East Asian type development
models pursue nationalist objectives and seek to achieve their goals through
an analysis of trends and policy options in a global frame of reference’ (1996,
91–92). He argues that the East Asian model was mistakenly (re)interpreted
through a lens of methodological nationalism, principally by the World Bank
(1993), to produce a body of flawed global policy guidance. His prediction was
that the inconsistency between the normative agenda of a globalized develop-
ment process and the emphasis on national economic policy would prove
unsustainable, but has proven to be wrong in the long run. Its persistence in
inclusive growth debates hints that there is a deeper foundation to the disjunc-
ture between globalist and nationalist framings than has been
expressed hitherto.
Clues to understanding this can be found in the analysis of the problems
that methodological nationalism holds for the study of politics (Jeffery and
Wincott 2010; Hay 2010). They note how methodological nationalism impedes
both the understanding of sub-state politics and (pace Beck) an understanding
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of increasingly globalised political relationships. In short, and in the
Skocpolian terms suggested earlier, methodological nationalism causes prob-
lems for understanding the dynamic relationships both within and between
polities (and policy decision-making) at different levels, from the local to
nation-state to global.
One route out of the trap of methodological nationalism, that both the
OECD and SDGs implicitly promote, is to conceive of the challenges of inclu-
sive growth in terms of a complex and adaptive system, where there are
dynamic interlinkages between economy and polity at all levels. The national
economy and polity represent only one level in a dynamic multilevel system
in which there are feedback effects between levels and amongst the various
actors who are operating in the system (Swyngedouw 2004; McGregor 2015;
McGregor and Pouw 2017).
A dynamic complex system is characterised by the qualities of non-linear-
ity, emergence, adaptation and feedback, all of which make it challenging to
model formally and gauge quantitatively, but it does provide a more realistic
representation of multilevel, dynamic interdependence in our globalised world.
This type of analysis yields a richer and more realistic understanding of what
needs to be done to achieve inclusive growth than that provided by an ana-
lysis restricted by methodological nationalism (Bousquet and Curtis 2011). But
the explanation of the persistence of this disjuncture in the SDG and OECD
approaches to inclusive growth is enriched further by acknowledging that
complex systems do not function without actors.
In the pages of this journal, just after the turn of the millennium, Hay
criticised the way that the term ‘globalisation’ was being used in academic and
policy literatures as ‘a process without subject’ (Hay 2002a). He argued that
this evoked globalisation as a deterministic process to which various national
governments and other actors reacted, rather than a process that was being
constructed through the beliefs and actions of the various actors engaged in it.
In arguing for a constructivist institutionalist account of globalisation, he pro-
posed that what was required is, ‘… a theoretical apparatus capable of linking
the relationships between agents and their structured contexts at a variety of
spatial scales’ (Hay 2002a, 385). This is precisely what is provided by a com-
plex-systems framing of the inclusive growth challenge.
It is then necessary to identify the different actors in this process and to
recognize that these actors have their own objectives, their own understanding
of what needs to be understood and how it needs to be understood. It is the
interactions between the ideas, institutions and actions of different actors that
constitute the dynamic globalised system. In the case of globalisation, Hay
argued that ‘beginning at the level of sub-national processes and economic
dynamics we can identify a range of strategic actors (businesses, governmental
and extra governmental actors, for instance) formulating a variety of strategies
(be they specific production–distribution regimes or economic growth strat-
egies)’ (2002a, 385). The cast of actors for the inclusive growth analysis is cur-
rently not dissimilar, but in recognition of the populist capture of
disillusionment with globalisation that was the starting point for this article,
we emphasise the need to factor in the electorate as another important set
of actors.
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Jeffery and Wincott (2010, 176) suggest that when Ulrich Beck is criticising
methodological nationalism, he seems to be particularly concerned to discuss
ontology and epistemology. We sspropose that this is where the driver of the
inclusive growth/inclusive development disjuncture lies and that it strongly
relates to our advocacy for a multilateral appreciation of wellbeing as a focal
point in any initiative.
Methodologies (e.g. for understanding and operationalising inclusive
growth) are, or should be, logically related to both epistemology and ontology
(Hay 2002b), but we propose that the disjuncture in the inclusive growth initia-
tive arises from the fact that different actors at different points in the complex
system operate with different ontologies. These different ontologies underpin
differing views of what we can hope to know about inclusive growth and the
system in which it is sought it (i.e. we can know about hard, objective, eco-
nomic facts), and thus have differing methodologies for how we go about
acquiring knowledge of it (i.e. what data is systematically generated and what
models are applied in analysis).
So, to apply this to the complex system, and as per the earlier cited analysis
by James (2011), the focus of attention of nation-state politicians and their eco-
nomic advisors turned away from a more cosmopolitan ontology towards a
more historic nationalistic focus as the effects of the 2008 financial crisis hit
home and the political sentiment of citizens in many countries turned towards
issues of jobs, security and national identity. For some politicians this has
become an overt and aggressive, populist political strategy (Make America
Great Again, UKIP, Alternative f€ur Deutschland, Rassemblement National,
Bharatiya Janata Party, Fidesz, to name but a few) and, as Scholte notes, ‘most
alternatives to liberalism on offer reject globality and look inwards’ (2019, 2).
Their focus of attention and analysis (their ontological point of focus) has
shifted more towards the national economy and polity.1 This shift, however, is
out of step with two other major sets of actors in the system. Large businesses,
particularly multinational enterprises, continue to operate with a global frame
of reference. Major globalist organisations such as the UN and the OECD con-
tinue to try to hold on to a broadly internationalist focus and frame of ana-
lysis. As we have hinted this contradiction is manifest in the SDGs and other
attempted global agreements. For one group of actors (elected nationalist poli-
ticians and methodologically nationalist economists) the ontology is focused on
the national polity and economy, while for other key actors, it is the globalised
system (Maki 2001; Pratten 2014). This inconsistency is internalised in the SDG
and OECD narratives on inclusive growth. At the same time, they try to speak
to the (re)emergent nationalist ontology, yet aspire to hold onto a broader, glo-
bal frame of analysis.
The tension is particularly evident in the attempt in the SDGs to ‘respect
the sovereignty of nation-states’ while calling for a cosmopolitan international
agenda. In a summative evaluation of the SDGs, the late Bob Deacon argued
that the agreement represents an attempt to construct the first truly global
social policy (in as much as that the goals and obligations apply to all coun-
tries), but that it fails to provide a framework for more effective global
1 After a brief period of optimistic and ambitious cosmopolitanism, as marked by things such
as the Millennium Development Goals and the Climate Change Agreements of Kyoto and Paris.
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governance (Deacon 2016). This, he argued, is reflected in the Implementation
Goal (17.15) of the resolution, which calls for signatories to ‘Respect each coun-
try’s policy space and leadership to establish and implement policies for pov-
erty eradication and sustainable development’. (UN 2015). As such, the details
of the SDG agreement signalled a retreat back to ‘an era of strengthened
national sovereignty and national self-reliance’ (Deacon 2016, 129).
This is the nationalist disjuncture in the ontology, but there is a second
major ontological disjuncture that also has to be understood to be at work in
the current inclusive growth narratives and that is in respect of its calls to
focus on human wellbeing. For one group of actors who adhere to the ortho-
dox economic growth doctrine, the ontological point of focus is ‘the economy’
(and particularly ‘the national economy’), and yet the call in the inclusive
growth narratives for growth to be evaluated in terms of human wellbeing
outcomes implies a different ontological subject. That subject is the human
being that has relations to other human beings and to the planet. From this
perspective, progress in economies and societies is not to be judged in terms of
economic efficiency or in terms of GDP or any other narrowly economistic
measures, but sustainable wellbeing outcomes for real human beings. If we
take a multidimensional view of wellbeing as advanced by organisations such
as the OECD, these wellbeing outcomes can be categorised as falling into three
interrelated dimensions: material wellbeing (the things that people have), rela-
tional wellbeing (the relationships that enable people to do the things that they
value doing) and subjective wellbeing (how they experience and evaluate what
they have and can do) (McGregor 2007, 2018).
Hitherto the economic growth orthodoxy has operated with an ontology
focusing on economies as systems which are populated by homo economicus, but
where the real people are largely missing.2 The shift towards a focus on
human wellbeing entails a change to a richer, more realistic ontology. It per-
mits a humanization of the analysis of economies and our world ecology, and
it calls for policy to shift away from its dependence on an inadequate analysis
of dehumanized and depoliticized markets (Lawson 2015; Moore 2017;
McGregor and Pouw 2017).3
A new narrative and a new framework for inclusive development
Through this analysis of ontological disjunctures, the case for a multidimen-
sional conception of inclusive growth is integrally related to the argument for
recasting the inclusive growth agenda in ways that acknowledge its multilateral
character. Two things are required for this new agenda for inclusive develop-
ment. The first is the development of a new narrative and framework of analysis
for a multilateral and multidimensional conception of inclusive growth; the
second is to have data that can be used to chart a multidimensional conception
of inclusivity at multiple inter-related levels in a globalised system.
2 Or more precisely are treated as if they formed an undifferentiated mass of
homines economici.
3 We should also note this is different from the ontology of the new behaviourial economics,
in which we see an emergent alliance between orthodox economics and psychology. We concur
with Will Davies’ analysis that the ontological shift in behavioural economics is not radical and
involves homo economicus being replaced crudely by homo psycho-economicus (Davies 2017).
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Dealing with the first of these, we need an analytical framework that fully
acknowledges the feedback or spill-over effects4 of national inclusive growth
strategies on the wellbeing of others. As we have proposed, the problem can
be understood in complex system terms, where the increased interdependence
of national growth and development strategies is acknowledged. As research
on global value chains shows, the wellbeing of citizens in developed countries
has become increasingly dependent on the efforts of citizens in developing
countries providing cheap clothing, cheap food, cheap migrant labour, crops,
exotic holidays and minerals (Phillips 2013; Phillips and Mieres 2015; LeBaron
and Lister 2015; LeBaron et al 2017). In many cases the supply of these goods
and services result in a loss of wellbeing for the people involved in or affected
by the production of these goods and services (e.g. poor employment condi-
tions, impoverished agriculture, land grabbing, the exclusion of migrant work-
ers, factory fishing and illegal mining). But it is also the case that the
wellbeing of increasing numbers of people in developing countries, usually the
growing middle classes, is dependent on goods and services produced in more
developed countries (technology, consumer goods, education). This inter-
dependence means that any efforts to protect or improve the wellbeing of peo-
ple in one country in the name of inclusivity, is inextricably tied to wellbeing
prospects of people in other countries.
The simple point here is that strategies pursued at the national level to
achieve greater inclusivity can and do affect the capacity of other nations to
promote and improve the inclusivity of their own growth and development.
Some have positive spill-over effects; others have negative spill-over effects. If
we take, for example, a national growth strategy premised on corporate tax
competitiveness (achieved through tax concessions to mobile investors), this
might help to achieve greater domestic inclusivity, at least in the short term,
through the creation of jobs in relocated businesses. But its aggregate effect on
regional and global inclusivity is almost bound to be profoundly negative
(through its propensity to render more fiscally unsustainable public spending
in other economies). The negative effect is likely to take the form of the loss of
jobs in neighbouring economies that may, in turn, take retaliatory measures. It
may also stimulate outward migration from societies adversely affected by this
tax competitiveness.
The second requirement is to have wellbeing data that is capable of sup-
porting initiatives to meet the multidimensional and multilateral challenges of
inclusive growth. We suggest that indicators that are currently used to gauge
national progress towards greater inclusivity be used also to place them in the
context of supra-national trends. In line with our argument for multidimen-
sionality inclusivity, indicators would then refer to the (relative) distribution of
outcomes across the dimensions of wellbeing, for a range of countries.
As we noted earlier, there are always those who have concerns about the
availability and reliability of wellbeing data, but the global initiative to find
measures of wellbeing that was launched by the Stiglitz-Sen-Fitoussi
4 We use the term ‘spill-over effects’ here rather than ‘externalities’, because, as we have
noted, the term ‘externality’ is a product of the methodological nationalism that plagues orthodox
economics. In a globalized and interdependent world there is no ‘external’, effects are experienced
in a complex system and tend to have effects on others somewhere else in the system.
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Commission has been underway for more than a decade, with considerable
progress made. The OECD’s Better Life Initiative5 has been running since 2011
and has accumulated wellbeing data on many countries, while many national
statistical services, in all corners of the world, have initiated their own national
wellbeing data collection programmes (see Boarini, Kolev and McGregor 2014;
McGregor 2018). Many of these programmes have been developed with tech-
nical support from the OECD statistical division and conform broadly to the
multidimensional wellbeing framework used by the OECD. The combination
of these two bodies of data provides a good foundation on which to build a
database for the analysis of inclusivity trends not only at nation-state level, but
also at sub-state and supra-national levels. The OECD already uses the Better
Life data to produce annual How’s Life Reports which chart human wellbeing
across OECD member states and the data has also been used in other summa-
tive reports to provide insights into patterns and trajectories of inclusivity in a
regional and global context (OECD 2017, 2018b - Latin American Outlook).
The national and international politics of inclusivity
Before turning to a more detailed consideration of what might be required to
operationalize such a multilateral and multidimensional approach to inclusive
growth, it is important to return to consider such debates in their contempor-
ary political context. As we stated at the outset, the big challenge for the inclu-
sive growth initiative is to change the dynamics of nationalist politics and
persuade those who have been or perceive themselves as having been
adversely affected by globalisation that it can be made good for them. We
have proposed a framework of analysis that ‘brings humans back in’.
The political impacts of growth models do not stop at borders; they can
have effects close to home and far away. As such the multilateral and, indeed,
global responsibilities of states need be brought into, and made central to the
debate about the nature of our growth and development and the strategies to
promote it. Domestic policy choices made by domestic policy-makers cannot
be judged solely by considering how they affect the citizens of the state in
question. Rather, we need to place such considerations in the context of a
wider conception of responsibility that includes a duty of care by governments
and nation-states to the citizens of other states affected by their actions in the
pursuit of inclusivity of both growth and development. What we propose is an
internationalisation of the notion of ‘Civic Capitalism’. In their review of global
capitalism after the 2008 crisis, Hay and Payne argued that if the recurrent cri-
ses of capitalism and the growing disillusionment of people with cosmopolitan
politics are to be avoided then our model of capitalism needs reform. They
propose a shift to a more civic capitalism ‘that puts the market in the service
of the public, as citizens, rather than the citizens in the service of the market’
(2015, 3). The argument for a multilateral approach to inclusive growth here
extends this idea to the global community of citizens.
5 The Better Life framework gathers data on 11 dimensions of wellbeing that are organised
into two pillars: ‘Material Conditions’ (Income and Wealth, Jobs and Earnings and Housing) and
‘Quality of Life’ (Health Status, Work-Life Balance, Education and Skills, Social Connections, Civic
Engagement and Governance, Environmental Quality, Security and Subjective Wellbeing).
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This might imply that the case for acknowledging the multilateral dimen-
sion of the inclusive development agenda is primarily, perhaps even exclu-
sively, a moral or ethical one – and, credibly, that might be an economic price
to be paid for the moral imperative of inclusivity. But our argument has been
to show that no such trade-off need be considered to exist. In a context of wid-
ening global inequality, above all one in which any dividends of globalisation
are not perceived to have been fairly distributed, it is perhaps important to
put the ethical case first and foremost. But there is an equally strong economic
case to be made for the inclusivity of development and the more equitable dis-
tribution globally of both income and wealth. The business case for inclusive
development is acknowledged even by the stoutest advocates of global capital-
ism to the extent that the World Economic Forum (WEF) has produced its own
report on Inclusive Growth and Development and have developed an
Inclusiveness Development Index (Samans et al 2017).
The economic case is disarmingly simple: that the concentration of income
and, above all, wealth in the hands of the few consistently and increasingly
suppresses global demand and, hence, global growth (for a more radical view
than that taken by the WEF, see, for instance, Sayer 2015). Put crudely, if a
proportion of the income and accumulated assets of the super-rich were trans-
ferred immediately to the very poorest in our communities, demand and con-
sumption would inevitably rise, as we know that the poor spend a larger
proportion of any disposable income they have, than the rich. As such, trans-
fers of wealth from the latter to the former – or development models that
more equitably distribute the proceeds of development from the outset – are
likely to promote aggregate demand and growth. This effect is further rein-
forced by the increasing disconnect between wealth and investment, in a con-
text of unprecedentedly high levels of both public and private debt.
Designing for inclusivity
Economies, and the businesses that comprise them, do not simply produce
inclusive development by themselves. Inclusivity is a public good that can
only be achieved through the coordinating function of a collective or public
good provider. If it is to be achieved, then it must be achieved through public
policy making. But unlike some other public goods, there is no end point at
which inclusive development is fully achieved. Economic growth and societal
development in all cities, regions, countries or groups of countries can always
become more inclusive.
So, what counts as inclusivity? Here we challenge directly a central
assumption of much current analysis and policy debate –that the inclusivity of
a growth model can be improved mainly through retrospective redistribution.
We reject this for two reasons. First, growth retrospectively rendered more
egalitarian in terms of its effects (through fiscal or other transfers) is not inclu-
sive in itself. As such, it would be misleading to describe it in such terms. The
second is more normative and directly addresses the political challenge of the
agenda – that we can and should strive to do better. If the goal is the sustain-
able inclusivity of our development (and the models and strategies therein),
there needs to be a strong preference for development designed for inclusivity
and sustainability, rather than for a growth dynamic which is only
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retrospectively rendered inclusive through fiscal redistribution. The less we
design our development to be inclusive and sustainable using corrective pre-
distributive policies, the more we must act later to attempt to render that
development inclusive and sustainable (through redistribution or cleaning-up).
In the longer run it is better to produce egalitarian and sustainable outcomes
directly from a model of development, rather than to achieve these through
the later use of fiscal transfers to compensate the losers of an unfair distribu-
tion of rewards and environmentally damaging outcomes.
Acknowledgement of this would allow a clearer mapping of policy choices
onto policy objectives. Some policies, notably those promoting inclusive devel-
opment, are predistributive, while other policies, notably those compensating
citizens for the non-inclusivity of growth and the accumulated wealth effects
of such non-inclusive growth, are (and can only be) redistributive. The disposi-
tional shift we are proposing would help interrogate growth models and
encourage politicians and policy-makers to answer whether inclusiveness and
sustainability are to be achieved by proactive design or by reactive
redistribution.
Yet, even this is not enough. For growth to be rendered inclusive, it is not
sufficient to just ensure through predistribution that income is more fairly and
evenly distributed over time. This leaves entirely unaddressed the question of
wealth inequality (especially that which is historically acquired). This has risen
more steeply since the crisis than income inequality both nationally and glo-
bally (Killewald et al 2017; Piketty 2014; Skopek et al 2014; Stockhammer and
Wildauer 2016). Central, then, to the inclusive growth agenda is the need to
find strategies that reduce wealth inequalities between citizens and between
economies. As with income inequality, there are prospective and retrospective
elements to this. Prospectively, the link between economic growth and the
asset-price bubbles so central to many growth models in the pre-crisis period
(see, for instance, Hay 2013) needs to be severed. Retrospectively, in the longer
run it may be necessary to tackle the issue of the inheritance of wealth. More
generally, redistributive fiscal measures need to be put in place to compensate
the wealth-and-income-poor for the highly inegalitarian dividends of such
growth models and the asset-price inflation with which it has come to
be associated.
Taking account of both processes and outcomes and the dynamic relation-
ship between them, we argue for shifting our focus from thinking about redis-
tribution to predistribution (Hacker (2011); see also Chwalisz and Diamond
(2015) and Hacker and Pierson (2010)). Indeed, we would go as far as to sug-
gest that while some redistribution may be necessary in the short to medium
term, it is only predistribution that can provide a route to sustainable inclusive
growth and development. Put bluntly, the use of fiscal or social policy to com-
pensate citizens for the inegalitarian or non-inclusive consequences of environ-
mentally unsustainable growth cannot and should not be taken as evidence of
an inclusive growth strategy domestically.
Similarly, international transfer payments designed to compensate other
states for the negative and malign spill-over effects arising from the growth
models of the economies from which they arise (such as EU regional transfers
or aid from developed to developing economies) cannot and should not be
taken as evidence of an internationally inclusive or sustainable growth
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strategy. Such transfers are, of course, both important and justified, but they
are retrospective responses to the non-inclusivity and unsustainability of
(prior) growth and development, not steps in the attainment of more inclusive
and sustainable global development per se. To fully render a global growth
strategy inclusive and environmentally sustainable means to design it pro-
spectively to be so. This means ensuring that all citizens can benefit from
strong and effective education, healthcare, regulation, competition and envir-
onmental policies to name just some features of an inclusive and sustainable
development model.
A multilateral framework for inclusive development
Thus far we have presented a largely theoretical and analytical argument for
the importance of acknowledging and transcending the problematic methodo-
logical nationalism of the debate on inclusive development. In this final section
we now seek to explore and set out the immediate, substantive political and
policy implications that follow from such an argument.
The most obvious of these implications, as we have argued, is that we can-
not continue to view the problem of inclusive development empirically
through a methodologically nationalist lens. This should be a powerful correct-
ive to any optimism which might accompany the growing evidence of national
inclusive development strategies achieving palpable gains in reducing the
domestic dispersion of income and wealth, as such successes at the national
level are unlikely to be matched, at least in the first instance, by equivalent or
even parallel reductions in international income or wealth dispersion. That
might well prove an important and chastening reminder of the intractability of
global and regional inequality.
The key question, as we see it, is the following: how might we establish multi-
laterally the conditions of existence of inclusive development at both the national and
international levels? As we have noted, part of this question has been posed
before6, but it was posed before the financial crisis and the subsequent loss of
confidence in the ideas of liberal globalisation and its global governance insti-
tutions. It is reposed here in the context of the revived inclusivity debates, spe-
cifically in relation to the SDGs. The global debate about inclusive
development does have some strong multilateral elements, which in recent
years, particularly through the convening role of the OECD, has started to deal
with some genuinely multilateral questions requiring multilateral coordination.
This is well illustrated by the OECD/G20 work on base erosion and profit
shifting to tackle tax avoidance (OECD/G20 2015). That ongoing work demon-
strates that concerted multilateral action can still achieve significant policy out-
comes and offers a glimmer of hope.
But to strengthen this work further, thinking on inclusive development
must be removed from its present methodologically nationalist comfort zone.
We argue that strategies and policies to promote the inclusivity of national
development models are more likely to deliver the inclusivity they strive for if
the wider multilateral and global context in which they are implemented is
6 See the Final Report of the World Commission on the Social Dimensions of Globalisation
2004. https://www.ilo.org/fairglobalization/report/lang–en/index.htm
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coordinated collectively and effectively. In short, there are a series of well-
known and much-studied coordination or governance challenges which pre-
sent themselves at a multilateral level, whose management is likely to shape
profoundly the capacity of national strategies in promoting greater inclusivity
of development to deliver tangible gains to citizens. Examples include inter-
national cooperation to avert or mitigate global climate change, global financial
market regulation and the coordination of taxation regimes to prevent offshor-
ing and tax evasion. Nationally inclusive development thus becomes condi-
tional and dependent not just on the national strategies but, crucially, on
global governance or, at least, on multilateral cooperation.
This, of course, raises the profoundly difficult political questions that we
signalled at the outset, relating above all to the perceived democratic legitim-
acy of the ideas and the kind of global institutions that would be capable of
exercising such a global governance responsibility. On the one hand, it might
be argued that inclusive (as distinct from non-inclusive) development is an
unimpeachable public good and that, accordingly, it is warranted in the pur-
suit of a benefit of unquestionable global value, even in the absence of a global
democratic mandate for such governance. But that is too simplistic a view, for
an exercise of such a global responsibility can be seen to pit global governance
institutions lacking a clear democratic mandate against (at least some) demo-
cratically elected administrations at the national level.
It is for this reason we propose that the inclusive development challenge
should not be thought of in terms of global governance or steering, but instead
as a challenge of multilateral coordination and cooperation that requires a key-
coordinating role for one or more of the global institutions.
The most important thing here is to launch and convene a more practical
conversation about how inclusive development might be realized whilst estab-
lishing and setting at least some of the terms of the debate. This is, above all, a
procedural question. Such a multilateral conversation on the international con-
ditions most conducive to inclusive development can proceed in very different
ways according to the preferences of elected policymakers. It would, accord-
ingly, be wrong in an article like this to either be too prescriptive, or to seek to
anticipate the precise details and likely content of that debate. But what we
can more usefully do is to set out some of its possible parameters – with the
proviso that they should be discussed and revisited with the participants them-
selves before the conversation commences.
So how might we usefully think about this? Our suggestion is that it is
potentially valuable to identify and to differentiate clearly between two objec-
tives. The first is to establish what the best practices are when it comes to
national strategies for the promotion of inclusive growth. The second is more
ambitious and innovative, though no doubt more controversial and challeng-
ing. It is to think in terms of the production of a compact amongst participating
states – relating principally, if not exclusively, to their mutual obligations and
responsibilities to one another vis-a-vis inclusive growth. Though the two are
clearly linked, and need to be developed in tandem, we will primarily focus
on the second, more innovative element.
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A new compact for inclusive development
The initial aim of the multilateral dialogue that we propose would thus be the
production of a prospective and provisional inclusive development compact
agreed between its signatories. It would be a roadmap for achieving inclusive
development that might include a statement of basic principles that includes
agreed definitions of inclusive development itself and some of its constituent
dimensions, a statement of shared purpose, a code of conduct and good prac-
tice and, ideally, a set of procedures for both the revision of each of these
items. In a way, such a compact would provide an answer to the question
implicit in much of the populist rejection of globalisation – how can globalisa-
tion be held to account publicly and made to deliver outcomes that favour not
just the few but the many?
To give it greater substance, it might also include a mechanism for griev-
ance articulation and/or dispute resolution in a context in which one or more
participant states are deemed to be non-compliant with the code of conduct
and good practice. This would be all-the-more important in a context in which
no global governance mechanism was charged directly with a responsibility
for global inclusive development. Yet, such a compact might in time become
the basis of a more globally multilateral structure, as the agreement (including,
perhaps, its grievance articulation/dispute resolution procedure) might be
expanded to include a wider set of states and stakeholders (such as leading
multi-national enterprises and other multilateral agencies and institutions).
Finally, it is important to be clear that the multilateral compact tentatively
outlined here might be a necessary condition for the transition to a globally
more inclusive development, but is by no means sufficient; a start, not the end,
of the conversation. It is likely that the promotion of global inclusivity will
ultimately require a global governance apparatus of some kind (again, it is
possible to imagine this taking multiple forms). But, what has been clear is
that there are structural political reasons as to why an inclusive development
debate at the global level is difficult at this time. As such, we suggest that it is
much better to think in terms of a multilateral process in the first instance.
Whilst this may in time establish the need for, and the desirability of, a desig-
nated global governance architecture and begin to build international public
support for it, it is wrong to presume that such support already exists. In our
view, then, it is preferable to first build a multilateral process that considers
the question of global governance. This is how we would propose responding
to Dani Rodrik’s ‘globalisation paradox’ (2012) – that economic globalisation
requires global governance, but global governance is incompatible with
national forms of democratic legitimacy. We contend that a global governance
regime designed in this way from the bottom up and informed throughout by
a genuinely multilateral conversation is far more likely to acquire global legit-
imacy than one imposed from above (see also Kharas and Rogerson 2017).
A new compact for inclusive development would need to be built upon the
following principles:7
7 These we set out in self-consciously tentative terms. It is possible to imagine that such a
compact might be structured in rather different terms. Our aim is more to give a sense of the
likely scope and range of issues that it would need directly to address were it to respond to the
multidimensional and multilateral challenge of inclusivity we have posed.
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A clear and shared definition of inclusive development (and, particularly,
a shift in the terms of debate from growth to development). Inclusive develop-
ment needs to be precisely defined so as to allow a clear (and, ideally, an
empirically operationalizable) distinction to be drawn (at whatever level)
between genuinely inclusive development strategies and models on the one
hand and non-inclusive development strategies and models on the other. A
new narrative would reject methodological nationalism and properly frame
inclusive development in the context of a recognition of de facto global inter-
dependence, where the wellbeing of citizens in different countries is under-
stood as mutually dependent. The sharing of best practice strategies for the
promotion of inclusive development would aid the development of such a
new narrative.
A clear and unequivocal commitment to inclusive development.
Signatories to the compact would commit themselves publicly to inclusive
development, both domestically and internationally. To their own citizens,
they would in effect be binding themselves publicly to the aim of distributing
more equitably the proceeds of economic activity; to one another, they would
be pledging that the domestic promotion of inclusive development would not
negatively impact the options for inclusivity of others. This double commit-
ment is crucial to the perceived political legitimacy of the process.
Appropriate metrics. A definition of ‘inclusive development’ that focuses
on improvements in human wellbeing for all and seeks to reduce inequality
would also have to be accompanied by a framework of appropriate metrics.
Most realistically this would entail complementing economically focused statis-
tics with metrics that capture changes in the other dimensions of wellbeing.
There are already significant initiatives underway to develop and apply such
metrics. The SDGs provide an almost bewildering range of 230 indicators
across its 17 goals.8 However, this is a work-in-progress and at the same time
there are other well established human wellbeing measurement regimes that
provide a sound platform to work from. Most noteworthy is the OECD’s
Better Lives framework that has been established for over 10 years and has
undergone refinement and revision (OECD 2011, 2017). Because of the multilat-
eral approach proposed here, it is important that these metrics are developed
not only on a national basis, but also relate to a universal framework that
would enable a comparable assessment of inclusivity spill-over effects.
Inclusivity that is designed and not achieved retrospectively. The compact
would state that a development model rendered inclusive only through the
retrospective application of fiscal, social and other transfers does not meet
such a definitional standard. Although fiscal and other forms of redistribution
have an important role to play in securing more inclusive outcomes whilst
development models remain non-inclusive, the ambition of the inclusive devel-
opment agenda is to reduce the need for such redistributive measures over
time as the effects of more genuinely predistributive instruments and strategies
take effect.
Recognition that all development models can be made more inclusive.
Whilst it is important to define inclusive development clearly and, ideally, to
8 See The Inter-Agency and Expert Group on SDG Indicators. https://unstats.un.org/sdgs/
iaeg-sdgs/
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specify precisely the elements to which it should be gauged, the aim is not to
impose a common goal upon participating states. Accordingly, a compact
would state that signatory states are encouraged to define the wellbeing they
seek and to weight the relative significance of the various dimensions of inclu-
sivity they seek to promote.
A global citizenship of states. Most challengingly in the context of current
international relations the compact would acknowledge that as well as their
(democratic) obligations, responsibilities and duties to their own citizens, mem-
ber states must also accept their obligations, responsibilities and duties to the
citizens of other states (and not just to other signatory states) with respect to
the model and strategy of inclusive development they seek to promote.
Recognition of the global responsibilities of multi-national enterprises.
We alluded above to the crucial role of businesses, and especially multi-
national enterprises (MNEs) in realising inclusive development. As such, it is
not just states that have responsibilities towards citizens in a world of global
economic interdependence. Globalisation affords them the opportunity and,
arguably, the incentive to extend and exploit their global value chains for
profit, and in doing so, create enormous wealth and also contribute to rising
global inequality. Somewhat ironically, given our analysis of the current state
of international relations, these business institutions are likely to be more
effective carriers of such a message than many populist nation-state govern-
ments. The implication is clear. MNEs too need to be brought to the table if
norms of appropriate corporate behaviour that are compatible with a global
strategy for the promotion of sustainable inclusive development are to be
established. A major aim of the compact should be to work with MNEs that
are keen to take (and to be seen to take) the lead in defining and promoting
standards of responsible business conduct (WEF 2017).
Grievance articulation/dispute resolution. Where a credible prima facie case
can be made that the spill-over effects of a particular development model or
set of development models are significantly negative and thus constrain the
ability of other states to pursue an inclusive development strategy of their
own, signatory states should be able to launch a dispute procedure within the
terms of the compact (or, at minimum, to be able to air publicly their grievan-
ces in the context of the compact).9
Incentivising policy coherence. The role and rationale for such a dispute
resolution procedure is not solely, nor perhaps even primarily, to provide a
mechanism for adjudicating on credible and specific violations of the principle
that domestic inclusive development strategies should do no harm internation-
ally (and should not be achieved at the expense of an increase in global
inequality). It is also to provide a context in which the broader lessons of that
kind of adjudication might be drawn collectively and incorporated within the
terms of a developing multilateral code of conduct with respect to inclusive
development. The ambition of this would be to encourage and to promote and
incentivise greater policy coherence between states.
9 Dispute resolution need not necessarily take on a legal or quasi-legal nature but what is
certainly required is a procedure for airing and, ideally, resolving grievances and for holding
states to account for their multilateral obligations vis-a-vis the inclusive development agenda.
The challenges of multidimensionality and multilateralism 21
This set of foundational principles is not exhaustive, nor is it intended to
be. It would rightly be contested once the process of developing a compact
begins; indeed, this contestation would be an important first step. But if the
current twin challenges of multidimensionality and multilateralism that under-
cut the inclusive growth debate are to be overcome, then we argue they are
principles that must be engaged with. Many of the principles are familiar and
can be recognized in initiatives such as the UN Global Compact or the
Business for Inclusive Growth (B4IG) coalition, coordinated by the OECD. Yet,
such complementary and over-lapping initiatives often stand-alone from each
other, and do not contain all the essential principles that we have proposed
are necessary to significantly move the agenda on. The B4IG coalition, for
example, contains many welcome elements, not least its acknowledgment of
the central role of MNEs, the encouragement for creating synergies with gov-
ernment-led efforts, and the call for businesses to ‘work together to define
actions or strategies that can trigger systemic change’ (OECD, 2019). However,
the central pledge around which it is structured offers little by way of a clear
definition and narrative of inclusive development, nor does it provide any sug-
gestion of the need for dispute resolution mechanisms. Nonetheless, the B4IG
coalition is a positive attempt to initiate actual policy changes from one
important set of actors with the aim of achieving greater inclusivity. Our pro-
posal for a somewhat more ambitious compact seeks to start a conversation
about how all actors can be engaged in that process.
In proposing a compact we are reminded of the old joke about the farmer
who tells the lost tourist asking for directions that ‘if I were you, I wouldn’t
start from here’. As we have discussed, this is not a propitious moment to
advance multilateral solutions to global challenges. But when is? At some
point the theoretical muddle and the set of thin policy ‘solutions’ that comprise
the current inclusive growth debate have to connect with the reality of the con-
temporary global political economy in a more substantive way than at present.
Our proposal for the convening of a multilateral process through which con-
versation, debate and challenge can occur is, of course, open to challenge. But
we would argue that unless such a step is taken, both the confusion and busi-
ness-as-usual will persist. Gaining acceptance of the need for such a process to
foster inclusive development, and subsequently the adoption of core principles,
would require patient diplomacy and statecraft, but there is precedent. The
annual Conference of the Parties (COP) to the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change demonstrates that such global conversations
about global challenges can take place, and whilst the COP process has not
always achieved its desired outcomes, it is a process that has coordinated sig-
nificant policy outcomes in first the Kyoto Protocol and then the Paris
Agreement of 2015.
Conclusion
Since the onset of the global financial crisis in 2008, the crises that are confront-
ing humanity have become all the more apparent. The scale of the environ-
mental crisis is huge and its challenge cannot be understated. We have
explained here how the challenges of inclusivity and environmental sustain-
ability are interconnected. In a period where the share of wealth and income
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held by the richest few, both nationally and globally, has risen to unprece-
dented levels, the challenge of achieving sustainable progress across its eco-
nomic, social, political and environmental dimensions is immense. In the
decade after the financial crisis, levels of wellbeing for some in countries
around the globe have improved considerably, while for others, whether in
rich or poor countries, the struggle to maintain a decent level of wellbeing has
become ever harder. It is this context that has generated an increasingly popu-
list, nationalist and protectionist counter-response, which many of those who
regard themselves as casualties of globalisation have rallied behind. This is an
unavoidable setting for the current debate on inclusive and sustainable devel-
opment – an urgent debate and the challenge of our age.
We have sought to show that the current narratives of inclusive growth are
critically flawed because they fail to resolve the disjuncture between an ortho-
dox notion of economic growth and a more heterodox ambition to focus soci-
etal development and progress on sustainable improvements in human
wellbeing. This disjuncture is further reinforced by the implementation of
inclusive growth where the agenda is de facto narrowed further by both a
methodological nationalist approach and the privileging of a narrow range of
economic indicators. The paradoxes and flaws of current initiatives are
founded in the differing ontological starting points of the various actors who
are active in the drive for inclusive growth. There are ontological implications
of demanding a focus on human wellbeing that must be accepted if we are to
move on from the economics of the orthodox growth paradigm to a notion of
inclusive development that is both more environmentally sustainable and that
is founded in a notion of globalised civic capitalism.
If the ideals of globalisation are to be revived and the global institutions
that coordinate it are to be rehabilitated, these institutions must be seen to lis-
ten to citizens and must be seen to build ideas of globalisation that bring bene-
fits that are relevant for the wellbeing of citizens, not just nationally but
globally. What we need is not just development, but just and sustainable devel-
opment. To achieve a more equitable sharing of the global rewards of develop-
ment, we need to focus on the globally shared responsibilities of states.
To move from analysis to action we have called for the launch of a new
multilateral conversation with the aim of establishing a new multilateral com-
pact on inclusive and sustainable development. But this process can only begin
if the terms of the inclusive development debate are changed from the national
to multilateral and the multidimensional character of inclusive development is
acknowledged and operationalized.
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